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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Melissa Heiner contends that the district court erred by denying her request to instruct the
jury pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1) (that a mistake of fact about the nature of the substance in
question renders a person incapable of committing possession of a controlled substance) and by
denying her subsequent motion for a new trial based on the failure to properly instruct the jury in
that regard.  The State responds that the mistake-of-fact issue was adequately addressed by item
4 of the elements instruction given to the jury (that they had to find Ms. Heiner knew the
substance was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance).  The State’s
argument is mistaken because the elements instruction only identifies what elements the State is
required to prove, while Ms. Heiner’s proposed instruction would have explained that finding a
mistake of fact deprived her of the ability to even commit the charged crime.  That issue was not
addressed by item 4’s mere identification of the knowledge element.  Therefore, the proposed
instruction should have been given.
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Heiner’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Heiner’s request to instruct the jury
pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1).
II. Alternatively, whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Heiner’s motion for a
new trial based on the failure to instruct the jury pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1).
3ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Heiner’s Request To Instruct The Jury Pursuant To
I.C. § 18-201(1)
The State does not challenge Ms. Heiner’s assertions on three of the four points on when
a requested instruction is required (that her proposed instruction was a proper statement of the
law, that a reasonable view of some of the evidence supports her legal theory, and that it was not
an improper comment on the evidence).  (See generally Resp. Br.)  Rather, the State only argues
that the requested instruction was adequately covered by item 4 in the elements instruction.
(Resp. Br., p.7.)
The problem with the State’s argument is that it ignores the distinction between
identifying what elements the State has to prove and explaining what a separate (though related)
finding of fact means under the law.  Specifically, in the drug possession context, the State has to
prove that the defendant knew the nature of the substance allegedly possessed. See, e.g.,
State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 83 (2015).  However, in this context, I.C. § 18-201(1) provides
that a mistake of fact about the nature of the substance deprives the defendant of the capability of
committing the charged offense. See, e.g., State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 7 (2014) (explaining
that, if the person actually believes the substance is a benign substance, they “cannot be
convicted of possession [of a controlled substance]”) (internal quotation omitted).
The difference between the two is actually illustrated by Ms. Heiner’s case.  The
prosecutor argued the jury should convict Ms. Heiner because the baggie was tucked away inside
her  purse,  and  so,  she  must  have  known  that  baggie  was  there,  and  because  of  the  manner  in
which she had tucked the baggie away, she must have known the substance inside was an illicit
substance.  (Tr., p.296, 17 - p.297, L.10.)  While that chain of inferences could, potentially,
4establish knowledge under the language of item 4 of the elements instruction, see, e.g.,
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 65 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that the knowledge element
“may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances”), it is not
sufficient to overcome a defense under I.C. § 18-201(1).  That is because a proper I.C. § 18-
201(1) instruction tells the jurors that, regardless of how suspicious concealing the baggie in that
manner might be, if they find that Ms. Heiner actually believed it (like the other baggie in her
purse) only contained aspirin, that mistake of fact would mean she was incapable of committing
the crime.  McKean, 159 Idaho at 83; Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7.  Since that issue is not addressed
by item 4 in the elements instruction, a separate instruction on the mistake-of-fact defense was
necessary. See State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating that “[a]
requested instruction must be given” if it is a proper statement of relevant law) (emphasis added).
This is true despite the State’s reading of the commentary to the pattern instruction for
possession of a controlled substance (ICJI 403).  (See Resp. Br., p.7 (arguing that, because item 4
was added to ICJI 403 following the decision in State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630 (1997), item 4
was intended to be the instruction on I.C. § 18-201(1)).)  That argument is belied by the plain
language of the comment itself:  “The statute [I.C. § 37-2732(c)] does not contain a mental
element.  The committee concluded, based upon State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1
(1997),  a  mental  element  as  set  forth  in  element  4  should  be  included.”   ICJI  403.   Thus,  the
committee simply recognized the jurors needed to be instructed about the existence of a fourth
element the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (“a mental element . . . should
be included”).   That comment does not mention a person’s inability to commit the crime if  the
jurors found a mistake of fact on that person’s part.  Thus, the plain language of the comment to
5ICJI 403 actually supports Ms. Heiner’s argument that a mistake-of-fact defense should be
addressed in a separate instruction.
That understanding is underscored by Lamphere itself.  The question Lamphere
addressed was simply whether the defendant’s lack of knowledge as to the nature of the
substance in his possession was relevant, and so, should have been deemed admissible during his
trial. Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 633 (in Lamphere, the defendant actually suspected the vial he had
contained methamphetamine, but was not certain of that fact).  That evidence was relevant
because the defendant could legitimately raise a mistake-of-fact defense under I.C. § 18-201(1).
Id.  However, the Lamphere Court did not discuss whether there needed to be a specific
instruction on the language of I.C. § 18-201(1) in the trial on remand. See generally Lamphere,
130 Idaho 630.  As such, the comment to ICJI 403 does not, simply by citing Lamphere, lend
itself to the State’s mistaken belief that item 4 is the instruction for I.C. § 18-201.
Rather, due to the limited scope of the Lamphere Opinion, the question of whether a post-
Lamphere elements instruction adequately covered the mistake-of-fact defense is informed by
other  decisions,  such  as McKean, Goggin, and State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242 (1999).
(See generally App.  Br.  (citing Lamphere only in regard to the assertion that the requested
instruction was a proper statement of the law and that a reasonable view of the facts supported
her legal theory).)  All three of those decisions indicate a separate instruction is needed because a
mistake of fact means the defendant is incapable of committing the charged offense.
Ultimately,  this  is  one  of  those  situations  where  the  pattern  instructions  cannot,  as  a
practical matter, address every question of law which may arise in a particular case. See Idaho
Criminal Jury Instructions, Introduction and General Directions for Use, p.1. In such situations,
“[a] trial judge should remain vigilant in observing the duty set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2132:
6‘In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their
information.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-2132(a)).  As discussed supra,  an  instruction  on  the
language of I.C. § 18-201(1) was necessary for the jurors’ information about what finding certain
facts mean under the law.
Item 4 of the elements instruction does not inform the jurors about Ms. Heiner’s inability
to commit the crime if they found she had a mistaken belief about what was in the baggie, even if
they might otherwise be able to infer knowledge from the facts.  (See generally Exhibits, p.24.)
Since the proposed instruction was proper statement of the relevant law and was not adequately
covered by the other instructions, the district court erred by denying Ms. Heiner’s request for an
instruction on the language of I.C. § 201(1). Macias, 142 Idaho at 510.
The State has not argued this error is harmless.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  Therefore, if
this Court finds that the district court erred, the case should be remanded. See, e.g.,
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013).
II.
Alternatively, The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Heiner’s Motion For A New Trial
Based On The Failure To Instruct The Jury Pursuant To I.C. § 18-201(1)
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief, the district court gave two erroneous justifications
for denying Ms. Heiner’s motion for a new trial – that the jury was properly instructed about
mistake of fact under the elements instruction; and that the proposed instruction was unnecessary
because possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime.  (See App. Br., pp.11-12.)
The  State  has  not  defended  the  district  court’s  “general  intent”  justification.   (See generally
Resp. Br.)  Rather, it simply reiterated its argument that item 4 of the elements instruction
7sufficiently addressed the I.C. § 18-201(1) issue, and based on that, it contends the jury was
properly instructed.  (See Resp. Br., pp.9-12.)
As such, for the reasons discussed in the Appellant’s Brief, the district court’s alternate
“general intent” justification is not a valid basis upon which to affirm its denial of Ms. Heiner’s
motion for a new trial.  (See App. Br., p.12.)  Thus, if this Court concludes that the jury was not
sufficiently instructed as to mistake of fact for the reasons discussed in Section I, supra, the
district court also erred by denying Ms. Heiner’s motion for a new trial.
As before, the State did not argue the erroneous denial of the motion for a new trial was
harmless.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  Therefore, if this Court finds the district court’s decision on
the motion for a new trial was erroneous, it should simply remand this case. See, e.g., Almaraz,
154 Idaho at 598-99.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Heiner respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment and remand
this case for a new trial.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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